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Thank you very much, Michael. And thanks to you and everyone 
at the Cox Center for organizing this conference and inviting me to 
speak. The title of my lecture derives from my book Power and 
Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11.1 Today I will 
talk about the themes of the book as they apply to the topic of this 
conference.  
The title of this conference invites the question: What’s at stake 
in this election for presidential power and foreign affairs and national 
security law? My basic answer is that relatively little is at stake. This 
is not a claim about whether our policy toward Israel or Iran or China 
will change. I’m not an expert in those fields, and I believe such 
things are hard to predict in any event. Rather, I‘m going to focus on 
what might be called “legal policy” topics related to presidential 
power, national security law and foreign relations law. My claim is 
that legal policy in these areas will continue on the same basic track 
of the last few years regardless of who is elected president.  
This prediction is not based on an analysis of campaign speeches 
or party platforms. The 2012 Republican platform said hardly 
anything about national security legal policy issues. But even if it did, 
I don’t think it would mean much for a possible Romney presidency. 
If you think I am wrong, if you believe that platforms matter, and if 
you are inclined to think there will be a big difference between a 
President Obama and a President Romney on the issues before us, I 
invite you to think back to how much President Obama promised he 
would change President Bush’s policies during the presidential 
campaign of 2008.2  
In fact, as we all know now, despite these pledges, and contrary 
to expectations, President Obama was much more aggressive than 
expected in asserting presidential powers.3 In many contexts, he 
continued late Bush-era policies (such as state secrets, surveillance, 
military detention). In other contexts, he continued but accelerated 
* Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law 
School. This speech was delivered on September 7, 2012, prior to the 
election.  
1. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).  
2. I summarize these pledges in Power and Constraint, chapter 1. 
3. See generally id.  
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trends that prevailed in the late Bush Administration. Consider three 
examples of the latter phenomenon. First, the Obama Administration 
ended the CIA interrogation and black site program. But that 
program was dying and practically non-operational during the last 
two years of the Bush Administration.4 Second, Obama ramped up 
targeted killings once in office, but he was actually continuing a trend 
of ramped-up targeted killings during the last two years of the Bush 
Administration.5 Finally, President Obama worked with Congress to 
tighten the rules for military commissions, but those changes were 
relatively small and continued a trend that had begun in 2002.6    
Understanding the structural factors that led President Obama to 
continue President Bush’s policies in these ways is the key to 
understanding why our basic national security legal policies will 
persist beyond the next election regardless of who is president.  
Obviously, if President Obama wins the election, he can be expected 
to pursue the same basic policies that he followed during the first four 
years. The more interesting claim is that if Romney wins the election, 
he won’t change Obama’s policies much. So what are the structural 
factors that led Obama to follow Bush and that would lead Romney, 
if he wins, to follow Obama?  
First, and most obvious, is the responsibility of the presidency. It 
is a truism that governing is much more difficult than campaigning. 
The occupant of the Oval Office has undelegable responsibilities for 
the security of the nation (and in many respects for the security of 
the world). Every president knows that he is invariably responsible for 
national security catastrophes. This responsibility focuses every 
president’s attention, and causes him to be risk averse about national 
security and to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy 
protecting national security.  
Second and relatedly, when the president enters the Oval Office, 
he gets access to national security information that the public cannot 
see. The president knows a lot more about what’s going on than the 
public does and what the president sees is a lot scarier than what the 
public sees. The threat looks much greater from the inside than it 
does from the outside. This asymmetric insider information leads 
every president to act relatively aggressively to protect national 
security.  
Third, every president assumes the perspective of the executive 
branch and inherits the practices and precedents that have defined 
the institution for over two centuries. No president is going to simply 
discard those practices and precedents, including the practices and 
precedents that support the exercise of presidential power—especially 
4. See id. at 16, 19. 
5. Id. at 13–14. 
6. Id. at 7–10. 
12 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Power and Constraint 
since, as just mentioned, the president has these enormous 
responsibilities to keep us safe. As we learned when Barack Obama 
came to office, presidents won’t renounce basic presidential powers 
and tools that are available and that can be deployed to keep the 
country safe.  
The fourth factor that undergirds continuity in national security 
legal policies across administrations is the national security 
bureaucracy. When a new administration comes in there is turnover 
at the surface of this bureaucracy. But just below the surface, one 
finds most of the same people from the previous administration, 
addressing exactly the same problems, collecting the same 
information, analyzing that information, and sending it to the new 
president. President Obama was unusual in keeping many of his 
predecessor’s top national security officials, including his Defense 
Secretary (Robert Gates), his FBI Director (Bob Mueller), and his 
head of the National Counterterrorism Center (Michael Leiter). And 
even when there was change at the top, such as when Leon Panetta 
became Director of the CIA, there was continuity just below. 
Panetta’s top Deputy at the CIA was Stephen Kappes, a long time 
CIA official who had significant responsibilities for the controversial 
CIA black site and interrogation program; and his general counsel for 
his first year was John Rizzo, the thirty-five-year veteran of the CIA 
who was the acting general counsel of the CIA for most of the Bush 
years and intimately involved in its controversial programs.7 I don’t 
mention the persistence of bureaucratic outlook to tell a nefarious 
story about the unelected bureaucracy running the country. The point 
is simply that national security problems are worked on across many 
administrations by professionals who continue to work on them when 
a new administration comes in, and inevitably the president’s 
information and advice and range of options are formed and to some 
degree bounded by what these professionals tell him.  
Fifth, and finally, I come to the largest and most important force 
that led to continuity—constitutional checks and balances. A central 
theme of my book, Power and Constraint, is that the main reason 
Obama continued the trends and policies of the Bush Administration 
was that the Bush policies as they stood in January 2009 had been 
dramatically changed over the previous five years. The Bush policies 
had changed in just about every area of counterterrorism policy, 
including military commissions, military detentions, surveillance, 
black sites, interrogation, habeas corpus, and the like. In all of these 
areas, Bush’s powers narrowed, in some contexts significantly. Why 
did this happen? Because, contrary to conventional wisdom, our 
constitutional checks and balances had worked remarkably well.  
7. See id. at 27–28. 
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The courts engaged the president during wartime like never before 
and issued decisions that narrowed presidential power in 
unprecedented ways. This was true in the Hamdi case in 2004, which 
recognized due process rights for enemy soldiers for the first time.8 It 
was true in the Hamdan case in 2006, which not only struck down the 
president’s military commissions, but also recognized, without giving 
any deference to the president’s contrary interpretive view, that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention governed in the war 
with al-Qaeda.9 That rule had profound implications inside the 
executive branch.10 And finally in 2008 in Boumediene, the Court held 
that the writ of habeas corpus as a matter of constitutional law 
extended to Guantanamo and that the detainees at Guantanamo had 
a right to pursue habeas corpus release in courts in the United 
States.11 All those rulings had the effect, in combination with other 
factors, of changing Bush’s policies, of moderating Bush’s policies, in 
many respects, of narrowing presidential power. They also had the 
effect (in combination with other acts, discussed below), of enhancing 
the legitimacy of these presidential practices.  
In addition to courts, and again contrary to popular opinion, 
Congress was deeply involved in pushing back against the presidency. 
This happened most significantly in 2005 when it enacted the 
Detainee Treatment Act, which closed a loophole in interrogation 
law.12 Despite the famous Bush signing statement, the Detainee 
Treatment Act stopped the CIA’s interrogation program in its 
tracks.13 Congress also had a big impact in narrowing and 
constraining the president in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.14 
Congress, in 2008, did give President Bush, at his lowest point of his 
presidency, large surveillance powers in the FISA Amendments Act.15 
8. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (“[A] court that 
receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy 
combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due 
process are achieved.”). 
9. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631–32 (2006) (holding that 
Common Article 3 is applicable to Hamdan, entitling him to judicial 
protection). 
10. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 179–81, 186–87. 
11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“Petitioners, 
therefore, are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the 
legality of their detention.”).  
12. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2739.   
13. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 119–121. 
14. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 
2600; GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 187–91.  
15. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436.  
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But they did so with an unprecedented array of internal checks and 
balances that, in my opinion, significantly improved the legitimacy 
and the efficacy of surveillance in the United States.  
These changes by the Court and Congress were supported by and 
in some senses made possible by other powerful forces at work. The 
press was much more aggressive in reporting government national 
secrets than ever before.16 Many of the published reports about secret 
national security activities inside the Bush Administration led to 
reforms in Congress and the Supreme Court.17 In addition, non-
governmental organizations were very powerful, both in litigating 
claims that led to some of these landmark decisions, and in criticizing 
the Administration, extracting information, and leading campaigns.18 
The forces that pushed back against Bush also pushed back 
against Obama, though from the other direction. When Obama tried 
to close GTMO and to conduct criminal trials of GTMO detainees, 
Congress pushed back hard through legislation and effectively stopped 
the president from doing so.19 So the supposedly feckless Congress 
that moved Bush to the center from where he was on interrogation, 
black sites, and military commissions also forced Obama toward the 
center when he tried to change national security policy in a way that 
Congress did not approve.  
These are the larger forces that explain continuity between the 
Bush and Obama eras, and that I think will lead to continuity no 
matter who is elected president in 2012. The fact is that most big 
issues of national security law and policy today are settled and 
legitimated by our constitutional system. There is a remarkable 
consensus in the country today about the scope of counterterrorism 
policies—a consensus reflected in Congress, in the courts, and in a 
White House occupied by the first two post-9/11 presidents. 
Regardless of who is president, this consensus won’t change much 
unless there is some large external shock to the system like another 
attack or some other dramatic external event.  
I now want to turn to under-appreciated structural considerations 
that affect the presidency and that I do think could affect change in 
counterterrorism policies. Not all structural considerations lead to 
continuity. There are some that lead to difference, and I want to close 
by talking about one.  
What the public and Congress and courts think about the 
president’s beliefs and dispositions, and how much they trust the 
president on certain issues, informs the effective scope of presidential 
16. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 51–82. 
17. Id. at 67–68. 
18. See id. at 161–201. 
19. See id. at 44–48. 
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power on national security issues. Since George W. Bush had the 
reputation of being a cowboy of sorts, and when he took aggressive 
counterterrorism actions, many worried, with reason, that he might 
not be adequately controlled. But one heard very few complaints 
George Bush was engaged in what we might call softer 
counterterrorism tactics, like trying criminals in civilian courts, which 
he did all the time. Similarly, few complained when Bush released 
hundreds of detainees from GTMO. Very few people complained 
about these policies because—and I‘m generalizing here, but it is a 
fair generalization, I think—the Democrats liked the policy and the 
Republicans liked the president. That’s too simple, of course, because 
on some issues (like interrogation) bipartisan majorities pushed back 
against President Bush. But as a basic slogan to capture a complex 
but real phenomenon, I think it works.  
The same thing happened in mirror image with Barack Obama. 
He came to office as a former constitutional law professor committed 
to civil rights. When he took “soft” initiatives like trying to close 
GTMO or to have civilian criminal trials for GTMO detainees, 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress pushed back. Some of this is 
politics of course, but some of it is insufficient trust of the president 
on such issues. On the other hand, Obama has gotten much more of a 
free ride than Bush did when he does aggressive things. For example, 
I think that the significant ramping up of the drone program, if it had 
happened under a Republican administration, would have been 
received much more harshly by Congress than it has been under 
Obama. For drones, Republicans like the policy and Democrats like 
the president.  
So, what are the implications of this point for the next election? If 
Obama continues in office then that same dynamic will play out. If 
Romney wins the presidency, we’ll go back, I think, to something like 
the Bush dynamic. I think Romney will have more leeway for 
releasing people from GTMO and having civilian criminal trials, but 
less leeway on drones and enhanced interrogation.  
This leads to my final point. One of the issues that I think is not 
completely resolved and is going to be an issue for the next president 
is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and its 
increasing antiquation. The AUMF was, as most of you know, enacted 
in September 2001. It is the basic legal grounding for most of the 
things the president is doing in the “war on terror.” The AUMF 
authorized the president to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against states, persons and organizations who were responsible for 
9/11. It has been interpreted by presidents to include not only al-
Qaeda and Taliban, but associated forces of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but around the world 
including Yemen and Somalia and elsewhere. The problem is that the 
terror threat is moving away from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and is 
moving towards what I call extra-AUMF threats, which are 
16 
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threatening groups that lack any affiliation with al-Qaeda.20 The 
problem for the executive branch is that the AUMF is increasingly 
unhelpful to the president in meeting developing threats. There’s a 
growing gap between the threat and what the AUMF authorizes the 
president to do.21 
I think that as a result of this trend, there is going to be a push 
for a new AUMF in the next four years. And here’s a non-disprovable 
prediction: If Barack Obama is President, he will garner a much more 
pro-presidential power AUMF than if Romney is elected, because he 
would be more trusted in the exercise of aggressive presidential 
powers (just as he receives more trust than a Republican would on 
drones). The upshot of this prediction is that if you’re worried about 
a new and expanded AUMF and you want to cabin it as much as 
possible, you should vote for Mitt Romney.  
Thank you very much. 
 
PROF. SCHARF: Jack has graciously offered to entertain your 
questions for 15 minutes. We have two microphones up here. I need 
you to come down and line up. Please state your name and your 
affiliation and ask a question and keep it short, because that way 
many other people can join in. If you’re up in the overflow room, and 
I know there’s about sixty people up there, please, also come down 
during this period and ask your questions. So, we’ll start with 
Professor Shabalala. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Good morning. It’s a real pleasure to have you. 
My name is Dalindyboe Shabalala. I’m a visiting professor here. I 
teach at Maastricht University in the Netherlands. A question about 
how you draw the line between discretion and legality. On some of 
these issues, I know for example with respect to the CIA decision not 
to continue the interrogation program,22 it strikes me that with the 
signing statement, what we see is that as an act of policy and 
discretion rather than admitting on the part of the establishment 
there is an actual legal barrier there. So it’s an exercise of discretion, 
and I wonder whether you think that exercise in discretion has been—
is coextensive with our concept of the legality of the actions?  
20. See Jack Goldsmith, The Growing Problem of Extra-AUMF Threats, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:53 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
2010/09/the-growing-problem-of-extra-aumf-threats/.  
21. See generally Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: 
The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=21 
38623.  
22. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 120.   
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And too then, after that, this concept of accountability. I think 
that is one of the biggest problems, I think, for a lot of the people 
over the past ten years is that even with so much that has been going 
on, so much that might have been considered illegal or, at least, 
should have been investigated as illegal, many people would argue, 
the sense of accountability for overreach or accountability beyond, I 
think, political accountability, but legal accountability, is that that’s 
missing, that nobody has paid a legal accountability price for much of 
the action that took place, including such things as torture. Do you 
think this is partly a function of the presidential power to protect 
other executive offices and that’s one of the reasons why or is there 
simply more of a political ambition not a prosecutorial discretion not 
to investigate?  
 
PROF. GOLDSMITH: There’s a lot there. On the first question, when 
the CIA went to the White House in late 2005 and said that it was 
not going to continue with the interrogation program, it didn’t invoke 
its discretion. It said that it had interpreted the law and concluded 
that the program had become illegal and that as a result it wasn’t 
going to continue. So, the CIA was interpreting the law and 
disagreeing with the president, who had a different view. Think about 
this in light of the debate about the unitary executive, which the 
Bush Administration was supposedly committed to.23 What the 
unitary executive means in this context is that the president is the 
chief law interpreter and can enforce that interpretation on 
subordinates. But that’s not what happened here. Instead, a 
subordinate national security agency said, “we’ve interpreted the law, 
and we’re simply not going to do this anymore.” This is a remarkable 
example of law being interpreted within the bureaucracy to put a stop 
of a practice against the president’s wishes, not as a matter of 
discretion, but as a matter of law. 
Your accountability question is a hard one. I talk about this a lot 
in my book.24 Accountability is a broad term and I think many people 
too often assume that criminal law accountability is the only form of 
accountability. It is true that there have been few criminal 
prosecutions arising out of the CIA program. But accountability is a 
broader concept. It occurs whenever an actor is subject to account by 
another institution that has the power to punish it or in some way 
alter its behavior. By this broader definition, the CIA program has 
been subject to extraordinary accountability unlike anything in our 
nation’s history. There have been scores of investigations of the CIA 
23. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 3–36 (2008).  
24. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 233–43. 
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program, some still ongoing.25 Those investigations have imposed real 
costs on lots of people, causing them to lose their jobs, to suffer 
financially, and to have their reputations dimmed and in some cases 
ruined. In addition, these activities were subject to two separate 
criminal investigations across two administrations. In the Obama 
Administration, John Durham spent years turning the program upside 
down, and he concluded that he did not have the evidence adequate 
to bring a successful prosecution.26 
Durham was investigating people who acted outside their 
authorizations by top Bush officials. I think there was an element of 
political calculus by President Obama in not being more aggressive in 
trying to bring criminal actions against the Bush Administration 
officials who gave the authorizations. The president and his 
subordinates are supposed to take into account community concerns, 
broadly conceived, in deciding whether to prosecute. I think he 
considered several factors in declining to do more in this context. Any 
attempted prosecution of a Bush Administration official for something 
that happened early in the war on terrorism would have been 
enormously controversial. It would have been very difficult, under any 
circumstances, to get a conviction, assuming that there was a criminal 
violation. And so an attempted prosecution might have been self-
defeating because it might have alleviated some of the stigma that 
now attaches to the early interrogation program. And of course, 
because of the controversy that would have surrounded an attempted 
prosecution, everything else the president was trying to accomplish 
would have been jeopardized.   
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: My name is Ben Davis, University of Toledo. 
My question is the following: To the extent that people know that we 
tortured, as said in a recent report, yesterday, again, Libyans saying 
they were waterboarded in Afghanistan,27 to the extent that most 
Americans feel that they were lied into the war in Iraq, how is it that 
in this consensus that it was the inability of the system, of this group 
that forms our national security strategy, or national security group, 
to get or be made to bear some kind of accountability for the 
enormous things that some people call crimes, like lying us into war 
or torture in our system. And I understand overseas, how the 
accountability affects things going on overseas. I understand there is 
an investigation going on in the European Court of Human Rights, on 
25. Id. at 108–12. 
26. See Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the 
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1.  
27. See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Libyan Alleges Waterboarding by 
C.I.A. in Afghanistan, Rights Group Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at 
A9.  
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what happened in the CIA black site in Poland and those proxy sites 
that are having their authorities looking at the things they did for us 
and deciding on prosecution for the things that we did.28  
 
PROF. GOLDSMITH: I don’t think I have much more of an answer than 
the one I just gave. I do think that there has been extraordinary 
accountability in terms of unprecedented scrutiny and various forms 
of non-criminal punishment, as I described. So I disagree with you on 
your claim that there hasn’t been a lot of accountability. And I think 
criminal prosecution, for reasons just stated, was simply infeasible. I 
don’t claim, by the way, that there has been adequate accountability. 
My aim in the book is simply to rebut the claim that there has not 
been accountability. But whether there has been too much or too 
little is a very difficult normative question.29 To determine whether 
there’s been adequate accountability you have to consider all the 
systemic effects of accountability that you’re talking about, including 
the systemic effects on national security, the systemic effects on 
everything else that the government is trying to accomplish. I think 
that any attempted criminal prosecution of top Bush officials would 
have blown up in President Obama’s face and failed, and President 
Obama realized this. I also think that an attempted prosecution 
might have watered down the disapprobation or taboo that today 
attaches to certain interrogation practices. I think President Obama 
took all these considerations into account in deciding to do what he 
did. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: I agree with your thesis that there has been 
significant overlap in continuities between President Obama and 
President Bush with regard to national security but I think there are 
significant differences in regard to foreign affairs. I was wondering if 
you would speak to that. For example, I think that the Bush 
Administration took a much more unilateral approach to decision 
making. They were far more able to launch what some people call 
illegal wars in Iraq.  
The Obama Administration, by contrast, had been far more 
willing to extend a helping hand to Iran. He used military force far 
more parsimoniously. There has been a strategic pivot away from the 
Middle East towards Asia. There has been a less striped tone with the 
Muslim world. So, I’m wondering, conceding that there’s been 
28. See Christian Lowe & Pawel Sobczak, Poland Provides Answers for CIA 
Prisons Probe, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/05/oukwd-uk-poland-usa-rendition-
idAFBRE88415V20120905.  
29. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 233–43. 
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significant overlap in continuity with national security, where do you 
think your thesis will also hold? 
 
PROF. GOLDSMITH: As I said at the outset, my expertise is not in 
pure foreign policy and I wouldn’t deny that President Obama has a 
different foreign policy than former President Bush, although, a lot of 
people have written about the remarkable similarities about how a lot 
of the things that President Obama started set out to do ended up 
looking a lot more of what President Bush might have done.  
But I do want to take issue with one ironic claim you made about 
the unilateral approach to decision making in war. When President 
Bush went to war, he got congressional authorization, both in 
September 2001 and in October 2002. President Obama, by contrast, 
did not get congressional authorization for the Libya invasion and he 
is in my opinion the first president to overtly violate the War Powers 
Resolution.  
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Jack, great presentation; great book. I did 
want to congratulate you. An interesting issue. The new book, No 
Easy Day,30 has come out in which a Navy SEALl says that they went 
after bin Laden, one of them popped him in the head with a rifle 
round, they slowly crept up into the room. They looked in. They 
found him lying in the door in the throws of death, quivering, 
trembling, something like that. No sign he was a threat and then they 
pumped several more rounds into his body.  
This leads to an issue that has haunted me but maybe it’s 
ignorance. Could it be said that this administration has taken the 
stance that since you can’t interrogate them in a method that’s likely 
to get useful information and word has gotten out, we really don’t 
need any prisoners, and it’s better to shoot them a couple more times 
than to have to feed and house them and worry about the lawyers?  
 
PROF. GOLDSMITH: Good question, Bob. I haven’t read the book. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Maybe a war crime? 
 
PROF. GOLDSMITH: It might be, the way you described it. But let me 
just answer the question on a little more abstract level. You implicitly 
raise the question whether the Obama Administration has substituted 
targeted killing for detention and interrogation. The rise of targeted 
killing and the decline of detention and interrogation was actually a 
trend that began in the last two years of the Bush Administration. 
The Obama Administration continued this trend, relying much more 
30. MARK OWEN & KEVIN MAURER, NO EASY DAY (2012).  
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heavily on targeted killing strikes and less on detention and 
interrogation.  
This raises the question about whether one is a substitute for the 
other. I’ve talked to a lot of people in the administration about this 
and here’s what I can tell you. Everyone at the top of the 
administration fervently denies that there’s any overt policy of 
tradeoff. I think that is right. But there are many people lower down 
who say that interrogation and detention became so fraught, legally 
and politically, that when it’s lawful to kill, that that option simply is 
a more readily available option for dealing with the enemy. And I 
think the tradeoff is inevitable. If you make one tool for 
incapacitating the enemy less available, you’re going to use the other 
tool. I do think that’s what happened. I have no idea if it’s happened 
in the Bin Laden context, but I do think it‘s happened, in general. 
Thank you, very much. 
 
PROF. SCHARF: Thank you, again, Jack for a fantastic keynote for 
this conference. His book, which I’m holding up is really a great read. 
Buy it from Amazon and put it on your Kindle.  
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